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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________________ 
 
No. 09-3550 
________________ 
 
GELSON LOPES BRANDAO, 
 
                               Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
                                   Respondent 
________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of the Decision of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA-1:  A040-144-317) 
Immigration Judge:  Walter A. Durling 
_______________ 
 
ARGUED May 24, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, FISHER,  
and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
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(Filed: August 16, 2011) 
 
Sarah J. Hunt, Esq. (Argued) 
Suite One 
99 Lexington Avenue 
Cambridge, MA  02138 
 
  Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Eric H. Holder, Jr., Esq. 
David V. Bernal, Esq. 
Zoe J. Heller, Esq. 
Thomas W. Hussey, Esq. 
Liza S. Murcia, Esq. (Argued) 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P. O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC  20044 
 
  Counsel for Respondent 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Gelson Lopes Brandao petitions this Court to review 
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision to affirm the 
immigration judge’s removal order.  Brandao specifically 
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challenges the ruling that a Cape Verde statute legitimated 
him, making him ineligible for derivative citizenship pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3).  We will deny the petition.   
 
I. 
 Brandao was born in Cape Verde on January 24, 1979, 
and admitted into the United States as a legal permanent 
resident on August 23, 1985, when his mother immigrated.  
His mother became a United States citizen on July 11, 1996.  
The Department of Homeland Security placed him in removal 
proceedings in 2008 for a 2005 conviction on an aggravated 
felony.  Brandao sought to terminate the removal proceedings 
pursuant to former Section 321(a) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) (repealed 2000)), 
contending that he derived United States citizenship through 
his mother, who was unwed when he was born and who 
naturalized prior to his eighteenth birthday.1
 
  Brandao did not 
provide any information on his biological father, claiming he 
did not know him.   
 The immigration judge ordered Brandao’s removal, 
accepting the reasoning of the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Service in denying Brandao’s application for 
                                              
1 Congress repealed section 1432(a) by enacting the Child 
Citizenship Act of 2000, § 103, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 
Stat. 1631.  The Act became effective on February 27, 2001, 
120 days following its enactment. Because all relevant events 
respecting Brandao’s claimed derivative citizenship occurred 
prior to the Act’s effective date, section 1432(a) controls our 
analysis.  
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derivative citizenship.2
 
  The Board of Immigration Appeals 
affirmed the immigration judge’s order. 
II. 
 While we generally do not have jurisdiction to review 
an aggravated felon’s  removal order (8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(C)), we do have jurisdiction to determine our 
jurisdiction, particularly in cases such as this where the 
petitioner claims to be a national of the United States, and no 
material issues of fact are presented.  8 U.S.C. § 
1252(b)(5)(A).  We also have jurisdiction to review 
constitutional claims or questions of law.  8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(D). 
    
 Under the REAL ID Act of May 11, 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-13, “factual or discretionary determinations are outside 
of our scope of review.”  Pierre v. Attorney General of United 
States, 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citing 
Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2006)).  
We give plenary review to statutory questions presented in 
petitions for review on derivative citizenship.  Jordon v. 
Attorney General of the United States, 424 F.3d 320, 328 (3d 
Cir. 2005).   
 
 We are mindful that, because there are dual sources of 
jurisdiction applicable here, a split exists among courts of 
appeals on whether the BIA’s interpretation of section 
1432(a) is subject to the deferential review specified in 
                                              
2 The immigration judge incorporated an earlier interlocutory 
decision on a motion to terminate proceedings into his April 
8, 2009 decision ordering Brandao’s removal. 
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Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).3  We have not addressed 
this issue.  However, deference to the BIA would not impact 
our conclusion in this case.  Therefore, we need not, and do 
not, discuss it here.4
 
   
III. 
 The INA section at issue reads as follows: 
A child born outside of the United 
States of alien parents, or of an 
alien parent and a citizen parent 
                                              
3 “By statute, the Attorney General is entrusted with the 
administration and enforcement of the INA, which states that 
the ‘determination and ruling by the Attorney General with 
respect to questions of law shall be controlling.’  8 U.S.C. § 
1103(a)(1).  The Attorney General, in turn, has delegated this 
authority to the BIA.  8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1).”  Restrepo v. 
Attorney General of the United States, 617 F.3d 787, 792 n. 2 
(3d Cir. 2010).  Yet, Courts of Appeals differ on the 
applicability of Chevron in the context of section 1432(a)(3).  
See e.g. Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 
2005) (The INA gives direct, sole authority to the courts of 
appeals on the issue of nationality, eliminating the need for 
Chevron deference.); but see Walker v. Holder, 589 F.3d 12, 
20 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[W]e are required to afford some degree 
of deference to the BIA’s interpretation in this matter.”).   
4 When the BIA issues its own opinion without merely 
adopting the opinion of the immigration judge, we ordinarily 
review the BIA's decision rather than that of the immigration 
judge.  Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir.2002). 
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who has subsequently lost 
citizenship of the United States 
becomes a citizen of the United 
States upon fulfillment of the 
following condtions: . . . (3)  The 
naturalization of the parent having 
legal custody of the child when 
there has been a legal separation 
of the parents, or the 
naturalization of the mother if the 
child was born out of wedlock and 
the paternity of the child has not 
been established by legitimation; 
and if (4) such naturalization 
takes place while such child is 
under the age of eighteen years. . . 
. 
  
8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1994)(repealed 2000).  In determining 
that Brandao is not qualified for derivative citizenship, the 
BIA referenced a Cape Verde law that it already interpreted 
in another case.  Article 2 of the Cape Verde law states the 
following. 
 
In the eyes of the law, all children 
are considered equal, enjoy the 
same rights and are subject to the 
same duties and obligations vis-a-
vis their parents regardless of the 
latters' civil status. 
 
Decree Law No. 84/76, Article 2, September 25, 1976 (Cape 
Verde) (reprinted in Matter of Cardoso, 19 I. & N. Dec. 5, 8 
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app. A (BIA 1983)).  In Matter of Cardoso, the BIA 
determined, in the context of reviewing a decision on a 
preference status, that this law abolished the distinction 
between illegitimate and legitimate children, concluding as 
follows.   
 
We now hold that a child who 
was born in Cape Verde on or 
after October 1, 1976, is deemed 
the legitimate child of his or her 
natural father under section 
101(b)(1)(A) of the Act.   
 
Matter of Cardoso, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 7.  The BIA took note 
of the immigration judge’s reliance upon this case and did not 
find any error.  Brandao disagrees that he is legitimated under 
section 1432(a)(3), arguing that the Cape Verde law was 
written to protect children born out of wedlock from 
discrimination, and that a separate procedure to establish 
paternity still exists at law.  Even if we accept Brandao’s 
claims as accurate, they miss the point.   
 
 In affirming the constitutionality of section 1432(a)(3), 
we held that it was consistent with the “important 
governmental objective of allowing single parent derivative 
citizenship while protecting the rights of alien parents by 
limiting circumstances in which it (derivative citizenship) can 
occur.”  Catwell v. Attorney General of the United States, 623 
F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2010).5
                                              
5  Other courts of appeals who have reviewed the BIA’s 
decision to deny derivative citizenship based upon section 
1432(a)(3) similarly interpret the statute as upholding the 
  In the instant case, we must 
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understand the term “legitimation” in section 1432(a)(3) in 
light of this objective. 
 
 Though terms in the INA must take their meaning 
from federal law, we recognize that where—as here—a 
statutory definition is lacking, it is sometimes proper to look 
to state or foreign law as a “rule of decision” to discern the 
statute’s application in a particular case.  Morgan v. Attorney 
General of the United States, 432 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 
2005).  In this context, we note that the BIA has developed a 
uniform approach to assessing foreign law in determining 
whether a foreign national seeking citizenship has been 
legitimized under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(c).  
  
When a country where [the 
foreign national] was born and 
resides eliminates all legal 
distinctions between legitimate 
and illegitimate children, all 
natural children are deemed to be 
                                                                                                     
rights of the alien parent.  See e.g. Bustamente-Barrera v. 
Gonzales, 447 F.3d 388, 397 (5th Cir. 2006)(analyzing the 
issue of legal custody under section 1432(a)(3)); Lewis v. 
Gonzales, 481 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2007) (Even where the 
natural parents were not wed, section 1432 ensures that “with 
few exceptions, both parents must naturalize in order to 
confer automatic citizenship on a child.”); Wedderburn v. 
I.N.S., 215 F.3d 795, 800 (7th Cir. 2000) (In the case of 
unwed parents, derivative citizenship under this provision is 
limited to “situations in which the other [non-citizen] parent 
has been removed from the picture-either by death or by 
‘legal separation.’”).   
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the legitimate or legitimated 
offspring of their natural     father 
. . . . 
 
Matter of Hernandez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 14 (BIA 1983).  This 
general approach to understanding foreign law is useful in 
analyzing section 1432(a)(3), because—consistent with the 
statute’s objective—it provides the broadest protection 
possible for the alien parent’s rights.  As a result, we conclude 
that it is appropriate to use this general rule to interpret Cape 
Verde law in Brandao’s derivative citizenship claim. 
 
 Applying the rule articulated by the BIA to the present 
case there is no doubt that, as the BIA determined in Matter 
of Cardoso, Article 2 of Cape Verde’s Decree Law No. 84/76 
abolishes the distinction of legitimacy and illegitimacy.  Upon 
the law’s enactment in 1976, every child born thereafter in 
Cape Verde—whether in or out of wedlock—is legitimated.  
Moreover, every such child is legitimated regardless of 
whether the natural father takes formal steps to assert 
paternity.  Brandao has utterly failed to refute this 
interpretation of the Decree Law.   
 
 Brandao was born in Cape Verde in 1979.  From this 
we conclude that, under Cape Verde law, Brandao is 
legitimated.  Accordingly, he is not eligible for derivative 
citizenship under section 1432(a)(3).   
 
 For all of these reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review.  
